Theories Of Vagueness


Vagueness as Arbitrariness-Sagid Salles 2021-03-12 This book proposes a new solution to the problem of vagueness. There are several different ways of addressing this problem and no clear agreement on which one is correct. The author proposes that it should be understood as the problem of explaining vague predicates in a way that systematizes six intuitions about the phenomenon and satisfies three criteria of adequacy for an ideal theory of vagueness. The third criterion, which is called the “criterion of precisification”, is the most controversial one. It is based on the intuition that a predicate is vague only if it is imprecise. The author considers some different definitions of linguistic imprecision, proposing that a predicate is imprecise if and only if there is no sharp boundary between objects to which its application yields some particular truth-value and objects to which its application does not yield that truth-value. The volume critically reviews the current theories of vagueness and proposes a new one, the Theory of Vagueness as Arbitrariness, which defines a vague predicate as an arbitrary predicate that must be precisified in order to contribute to a sentence that has truth-conditions. The main advantages of this theory over the current alternatives are that it satisfies all three criteria and systematizes the relevant intuitions.

Vagueness and Its Boundaries-David Wells Agler 2010 Many theories of vagueness employ question-begging assumptions about the semantic boundaries between truth and falsity. This thesis defends a theory of vagueness put forward by Charles S. Peirce and argues for a novel solution to the sorites paradox based upon his work. Contrary to widespread opinion, I argue that Peirce distinguished borderline vagueness from other related forms of indeterminacy, e.g. indefiniteness, generality, unspecificity, un informativity, etc. By clarifying Peirce’s conception of borderline vagueness, I argue for a solution to the sorites paradox based upon his logical semantics. In addition, I argue for this theory against the epistemic theory of vagueness, which makes controversial claims concerning the sharp semantic boundary between truth and falsity, and against the supervaluationist theory of vagueness, which is committed to the in principle impossibility of sharp semantics boundaries for propositions with vague terms.

Vague Objects and Vague Identity-Ken Akiba 2014-03-18 This unique anthology of new, contributed essays offers a range of perspectives on various aspects of ontic vagueness. It seeks to answer core questions pertaining to onticism, the view that vagueness exists in the world itself. The questions to be addressed include whether vague objects must have vague identity, and whether ontic vagueness has a distinctive logic, one that is not shared by semantic or epistemic vagueness. The essays in this volume explain the motivations behind onticism, such as the plausibility of mereological vagueness and indeterminacy in quantum mechanics and they offer various arguments both for and against ontic vagueness; onticism is also compared with other, competing theories of vagueness such as semanticism, the view that vagueness exists only in our linguistic representation of the world. Gareth Evans’s influential paper of 1978, “Can There Be Vague Objects?” gave a simple but cogent argument against the coherence of ontic vagueness. Onticism was subsequently dismissed by many. However, in recent years, researchers have become aware of the logical gaps in Evans’s argument and this has triggered a new wave of interest in onticism. Onticism is now widely regarded as at least a coherent view. Reflecting this growing consensus, the present anthology for the first time puts together essays that are focused on onticism and its various facets and it fills in the lacuna in the literature on vagueness, a much-discussed subject in contemporary philosophy.

Vagueness and the Law-Ralf Poscher 2017-01-07 Vague expressions are omnipresent in natural language. As such, their use in legal texts is virtually inevitable. If a law contains vague terms, the question whether it applies to a particular case often lacks a clear answer. One of the fundamental pillars of the rule of law is legal certainty. The determinacy of the law enables people to use it as a guide and places judges in the position to decide impartially. Vagueness poses a threat to these
ideals. In borderline cases, the law seems to be indeterminate and thus incapable of serving its core rule of law value. In the philosophy of language, vagueness has become one of the hottest topics of the last two decades. Linguists and philosophers have investigated what distinguishes “soritical” vagueness from other kinds of linguistic indeterminacy, such as ambiguity, generality, open texture, and family resemblance concepts. There is a vast literature that discusses the logical, semantic, pragmatic, and epistemic aspects of these phenomena. Legal theory has hitherto paid little attention to the differences between the various kinds of linguistic indeterminacy that are grouped under the heading of “vagueness,” let alone to the various theories that try to account for these phenomena. Bringing together leading scholars working on the topic of vagueness in philosophy and in law, this book fosters a dialogue between philosophers and legal scholars by examining how philosophers conceive vagueness in law from their theoretical perspective and how legal theorists make use of philosophical theories of vagueness. The chapters of the book are organized into three parts. The first part addresses the import of different theories of vagueness for the law, referring to a wide range of theories from supervaluationist to contextualist and semantic realist accounts in order to address the question of whether the law can learn from engaging with philosophical discussions of vagueness. The second part of the book examines different vagueness phenomena. The contributions in part 2 suggest that the greater awareness to different vagueness phenomena can make lawyers aware of specific issues and solutions so far overlooked. The third part deals with the pragmatic aspects of vagueness in law, providing answers to the question of how to deal with vagueness in law and with the professional, political, moral, and ethical issues such vagueness gives rise to.

Vagueness: A Guide—Giuseppina Ronzitti 2011-03-03 This volume explores how vagueness matters as a specific problem in the context of theories that are primarily about something else. After an introductory chapter on the Sorites paradox, which exposes the various forms the paradox can take and some of the responses that have been pursued, the book proceeds with a chapter on vagueness and metaphysics, which covers important questions concerning vagueness that arise in connection with the deployment of certain key metaphysical notions. Subsequent chapters address the following: vagueness and logic, which discusses the sort of model theory that is suggested by the main, rival accounts of vagueness; vagueness and meaning, which focuses on contextualist, epistemicist, and indeterminist theories; vagueness and observationality; vagueness within linguistics, which focuses on approaches that take comparison classes into account; and the idea that vagueness in law is typically extravagant and that extravagant vagueness is a necessary feature of legal systems.

Vagueness and Borderline Cases—Helen Daly 2011 Vagueness is ubiquitous in natural language. It seems incompatible with classical, bivalent logic, which tells us that every statement is either true or false, and none is vaguely true. Yet we do manage to reason using vague natural language. In fact, the majority of our day-to-day reasoning involves vague terms and concepts. There is a puzzle here: how do we perform this remarkable feat of reasoning? I argue that vagueness is a kind of semantic indecision. In short, that means we cannot say exactly who is bald and who is not because we have never decided the precise meaning of the word ‘bald’—there are some borderline cases in the middle, which might be bald or might not. That is a popular general strategy for addressing vagueness. Those who use it, however, do not often say what they mean by ‘borderline case’. It is most frequently used in a loose way to refer to in-between items: those people who are neither clearly bald nor clearly not bald. But under that loose description, the notion of borderline cases is ambiguous, and some of its possible meanings create serious problems for semantic theories of vagueness. Here, I clarify the notion of a borderline case, so that borderline cases can be used profitably as a key element in a successful theory of vagueness. After carefully developing my account of borderline cases, I demonstrate its usefulness by proposing a theory of vagueness based upon it. My theory, vagueness as permission, explains how classical logic can be used to model even vague natural language.

Unruly Words—Diana Raffman 2014-02 In Unruly Words, Diana Raffman advances a new theory of vagueness which, unlike previous accounts, is genuinely semantic while preserving bivalence.
According to this new approach, called the multiple range theory, vagueness consists essentially in a term's being applicable in multiple arbitrarily different, but equally competent, ways, even when contextual factors are fixed.

Theories of Vagueness-Nathaniel Moore 2012
Living on the Slippery Slope-Elia Zardini 2008
Theories and Logic of Vagueness-Rosanna Jancis Keefe 1997
Vagueness and Degrees of Truth-Nicholas J. J. Smith 2008-11-06 In Vagueness and Degrees of Truth, Nicholas Smith develops a new theory of vagueness: fuzzy plurivaluationism. A predicate is said to be vague if there is no sharply defined boundary between the things to which it applies and the things to which it does not apply. For example, 'heavy' is vague in a way that 'weighs over 20 kilogram' is not. A great many predicates - both in everyday talk, and in a wide array of theoretical vocabularies, from law to psychology to engineering - are vague. Smith argues, on the basis of a detailed account of the defining features of vagueness, that an accurate theory of vagueness must involve the idea that truth comes in degrees. The core idea of degrees of truth is that while some sentences are true and some are false, others possess intermediate truth values: they are truer than the false sentences, but not as true as the true ones. Degree-theoretic treatments of vagueness have been proposed in the past, but all have encountered significant objections. In light of these, Smith develops a new type of degree theory. Its innovations include a definition of logical consequence that allows the derivation of a classical consequence relation from the degree-theoretic semantics, a unified account of degrees of truth and subjective probabilities, and the incorporation of semantic indeterminacy - the view that vague statements need not have unique meanings - into the degree-theoretic framework. As well as being essential reading for those working on vagueness, Smith's book provides an excellent entry-point for newcomers to the era - both from elsewhere in philosophy, and from computer science, logic and engineering. It contains a thorough introduction to existing theories of vagueness and to the requisite logical background.

Vagueness and Rationality in Language Use and Cognition-Richard Dietz 2019-09-17 This volume presents new conceptual and experimental studies which investigate the connection between vagueness and rationality from various systematic directions, such as philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology, computing science, and economics. Vagueness in language use and cognition has traditionally been interpreted in epistemic or semantic terms. The standard view of vagueness specifically suggests that considerations of agency or rationality, broadly conceived, can be left out of the equation. Most recently, new literature on vagueness has been released which suggests that the standard view is inadequate and that considerations of rationality should factor into more comprehensive models of vagueness. The methodological approaches presented here are diverse, ranging from philosophical interpretations of rational credence for vagueness to adaptations of choice theory (dynamic choice theory, revealed preference models, social choice theory), probabilistic models of pragmatic reasoning (Bayesian pragmatics), evolutionary game theory, and conceptual space models of categorisation.

Vagueness in Psychiatry-Professor of Philosophy Geert Keil 2016-11-03 Blurred boundaries between the normal and the pathological are a recurrent theme in almost every publication concerned with the classification of mental disorders. However, systematic approaches that take into account the philosophical discussions about vagueness are rare. This is the first volume to systematically draw various lines of philosophical and psychiatric inquiry together, including the debates about categorical versus dimensional approaches in current psychiatric classification systems, the principles of psychiatric classification, the problem of prodromal phases and sub-threshold disorders, and the problem of over-diagnosis in psychiatry, and to explore the connections of these debates to philosophical discussions about vagueness. The book consists of three parts. The first part encompasses historical and recent philosophical positions regarding the nature of demarcation problems in nosology. Here, the authors discuss the pros and cons of gradualist approaches to health and disease, and the relevance of philosophical discussions of vagueness for these debates. The second part of the book narrows the focus to psychiatric nosology. The authors approach the
vagueness of psychiatric classification by drawing on contentious medical categories, such as PTSD or schizophrenia, and on the dilemmas of day-to-day diagnostic and therapeutic practice. Against this background, the chapters critically evaluate how current revisions of the ICD and DSM manuals conceptualise mental disorders and how they are applied in various contexts. The third part is concerned with social, moral, and legal implications that arise when being mentally ill is a matter of degree. Not surprisingly, the law is ill-equipped to deal with these challenges due to its binary logic. Still, the authors show that there are more and less reasonable ways of dealing with blurred boundaries and of arriving at warranted decisions in hard cases.

Vagueness, Logic and Ontology-Dominic Hyde 2016-02-17 The topic of vagueness re-emerged in the twentieth century from relative obscurity. It deals with the phenomenon in natural language that manifests itself in apparent semantic indeterminacy - the indeterminacy, for example, that arises when asked to draw the line between the tall and non-tall, or the drunk and the sober. An associated paradox emphasises the challenging nature of the phenomenon, presenting one of the most resilient paradoxes of logic. The apparent threat posed for orthodox theories of the semantics and logic of natural language has become the focus of intense philosophical scrutiny amongst philosophers and non-philosophers alike. Vagueness, Logic and Ontology explores various responses to the philosophical problems generated by vagueness and its associated paradox - the sorites paradox. Hyde argues that the theoretical space in which vagueness is sometimes ontologically grounded and modelled by a truth-functional logic affords a coherent response to the problems posed by vagueness. Showing how the concept of vagueness can be applied to the world, Hyde's ontological account proposes a substantial revision of orthodox semantics, metaphysics and logic. This book will be of particular interest to readers in philosophy, linguistics, cognitive science and geographic information systems.

Vagueness and Thought-Andrew Bacon 2018-05-03 Vagueness is the study of concepts that admit borderline cases. The epistemology of vagueness concerns attitudes we should have towards propositions we know to be borderline. On this basis Andrew Bacon develops a new theory of vagueness in which vagueness is fundamentally a property of propositions, explicated in terms of its role in thought.

Vagueness-L. Burns 2012-12-06 This work is in two parts. It began as a general investigation of vagueness in natural languages. The Sorites Paradox came to dominate the work however, and the second part of the book consists in an discussion of that puzzle and related problems. The first part contains a general discussion of the nature of vagueness and its sources. I discuss various conceptions of vagueness in chapter 1 and outline some of the problems to do with the conception of vagueness as a linguistic phenomenon. The most interesting of these is the Sorites paradox, which occurs where natural languages exhibit a particular variety of borderline case vagueness. I discuss some sources of vagueness of the borderline case variety, and views of the relation between linguistic behaviour and languages which are vague in this sense. I argue in chapter 2 that these problems are not to be easily avoided by statistical averaging techniques or attempts to provide a mathematical model of consensus in linguistic usage. I also consider in chapter 3 various approaches to the problem of providing an adequate logic and semantics for vague natural languages, and argue against two currently popular approaches to vagueness. These are supervaluation accounts which attempt to provide precise semantic models for vague languages based on the notion of specification spaces, and attempts to replace the laws of classical logic with systems of fuzzy logic.

The Epistemic Theory of Vagueness-Robert Michels 2008

Vagueness, Gradability and Typicality-Galit W. 2013-03-14 This book presents a study of the connections between vagueness and gradability, and their different manifestations in adjectives (morphological gradability effects) and nouns (typicality effects). It addresses two opposing theoretical approaches from within formal semantics and cognitive psychology.

Topics on Vagueness-Bertil Rolf 1981

Vagueness and Contradiction-Roy A. Sorensen 2004 Did Buddha become a fat man in one second? Is there a tallest short giraffe? Epistemicians answer 'Yes!' They believe that any predicate that divides
things divides them sharply. They solve the ancient sorites paradox by picturing vagueness as a kind of ignorance. The alternative solutions are radical. They either reject classical theorems or inference rules or reject our common sense view of what can exist. Epistemicists spare this central portion of our web of belief by challenging peripheral intuitions about the nature of language. So why is this continuation of the status quo so incredible? Why do epistemicists themselves have trouble believing their theory? In Vagueness and Contradiction Roy Sorensen traces our incredulity to linguistic norms that build upon our psychological tendencies to round off insignificant differences. These simplifying principles lead to massive inconsistency, rather like the rounding off errors of calculators with limited memory. English entitles speakers to believe each 'tolerance conditional' such as those of the form 'If n is small, then n + 1 is small.' The conjunction of these a priori beliefs entails absurd conditionals such as 'If 1 is small, then a billion is small.' Since the negation of this absurdity is an a priori truth, our a priori beliefs about small numbers are jointly inconsistent. One of the tolerance conditionals, at the threshold of smallness, must be an analytic falsehood that we are compelled to regard as a tautology. Since there are infinitely many analytic sorites arguments, Sorensen concludes that we are obliged to believe infinitely many contradictions. These contradictions are not specifically detectable. They are ineliminable, like the heat from a light bulb. Although the light bulb is not designed to produce heat, the heat is inevitably produced as a side-effect of illumination. Vagueness can be avoided by representational systems that make no concession to limits of perception, or memory, or testimony. But quick and rugged representational systems, such as natural languages, will trade 'rationality' for speed and flexibility. Roy Sorensen defends epistemicism in his own distinctive style, inventive and amusing. But he has some serious things to say about language and logic, about the way the world is and about our understanding of it.

Vagueness-Rosanna Keefe 1996 'This timely anthology provides an inviting first step to anyone interested in the sorites paradox. The issues are developed with an agreeable blend of logic and history. Each step of the dialectic is followed by a yet more interesting step. Consequently, even veterans of vagueness will marvel at how the editors have compressed so much wisdom into only finitely many pages.' -- Roy A. Sorensen, Professor of Philosophy, NYU Vagueness is currently the subject of vigorous debate in the philosophy of logic and language. Vague terms--such as 'tall', 'red', 'bald', and 'tadpole'--have borderline cases (arguably, someone may be neither tall nor not tall); and they lack well-defined extensions (there is no sharp boundary between tall people and the rest). So the phenomenon of vagueness poses a fundamental challenge to classical logic and semantics, which assumes that propositions are either true or false and that extensions are determinate. Another striking problem to which vagueness gives rise is the sorites paradox. If you remove one grain from a heap of sand, surely you must be left with a heap. Yet apply this principle repeatedly as you remove grains one by one, and you end up, absurdly, with a solitary grain that counts as a heap. This anthology collects for the first time the most important papers in the area. After a substantial introduction that surveys the field, the essays form four groups, starting with some historically notable pieces. The 1970s saw an explosion of interest in vagueness, and the second group of essays reprints classic papers from this period. The following group of papers represent the best recent work on the logic and semantics of vagueness. The essays in the final group are contributions to the continuing debate about vague objects and vague identity. Contributors include: Max Black, James Cargile, Michael Dummett, Dorothy Edgington, Gareth Evans, Kit Fine, Carl G. Hempel, Rosanna Keefe, David Lewis, Kenton F. Machina, Henryk Mehlberg, Terence Parsons, Bertrand Russell, R. M. Sainsbury, Peter Smith, Michael Tye, Timothy Williamson, Peter Woodruff, Crispin Wright.

Vagueness -- 8. Legal Practice and Theories of Vagueness.

The (topo)logic of Vagueness-Brian Hill 2007 Zeno's "dichotomy" paradox of the runner and the sorites paradox ex-hibit certain interesting similarities. Both of them involve a long series of steps, each of which seems legitimate, but which, taken together, apparently lead to an unacceptable conclusion. In this article, a particular interpretation of a common reply to Zeno's paradox is presented, which recognises that to defuse the paradox, it is necessary to assert that the number of stages that the runner has completed on Zeno's infinite sequence of times is not an appropriate measure of whether he finishes the race or not. Applying this style of reply to the sorites argument, one would reject the argument on the grounds of the inappropriateness of the number of hairs for reasoning about baldness. Such an attitude to the sorites argument implies a certain conception of the problem posed by vague terms, according to which the problem is to understand such relationships between terms as the appropriateness of one for reasoning about the other.

Consequently, it poses a certain set of challenges to prospective theories of vagueness.

Modernist Fiction and Vagueness-Megan Quigley 2015-02-02 Modernist Fiction and Vagueness examines the development of the modernist novel in relation to changing approaches to philosophy. It argues that the puzzle of vagueness challenged the great thinkers of the early twentieth century and led to dramatic changes in both fiction and philosophy. Building on recent interest in the connections among analytic philosophy, pragmatism, and modern literature, this book posits that literary vagueness should be read as a defining quality of modernist fiction.

The Semantics of Gradability, Vagueness, and Scale Structure-Elena Castroviejo 2018-06-20 This volume is the first to focus specifically on experimental studies of the semantics of gradability, scale structure and vagueness. It presents support for and challenges to current formal analyses of these phenomena in view of experimentally collected data, highlighting the ways semantic and pragmatic theory can benefit from experimental methodologies. The papers in the volume contribute to an explicit and detailed account of the use, representation, and online processing of gradable and vague expressions using various kinds of controlled speaker judgment tasks, eye tracking, and ERP. The aim is to strengthen the foundations of experimental semantics and promote interaction between linguists, psycholinguists, psychologists, and philosophers who are interested in the semantics of natural language. Using data representing different languages and a variety of nominal and adjectival constructions, including degree modification and comparatives, the contributions address scale-based classifications of gradable predicates, such as the absolute vs. relative distinction; the nature of the standards for applicability of gradable expressions and the ways in which standards are determined; the nature of dimensions and multidimensionality in the meaning of scalar expressions; and the role of embodiment, subjectivity, and sociolinguistic considerations in the use and understanding of gradable expressions.

Vagueness and Rationality in Language Use and Cognition- 2019 This volume presents new conceptual and experimental studies which investigate the connection between vagueness and rationality from various systematic directions, such as philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology, computing science, and economics. Vagueness in language use and cognition has traditionally been interpreted in epistemic or semantic terms. The standard view of vagueness specifically suggests that considerations of agency or rationality, broadly conceived, can be left out of the equation. Most recently, new literature on vagueness has been released which suggests that the standard view is inadequate and that considerations of rationality should factor into more comprehensive models of vagueness. The methodological approaches presented here are diverse, ranging from philosophical interpretations of rational credence for vagueness to adaptations of choice theory (dynamic choice theory, revealed preference models, social choice theory), probabilistic models of pragmatic reasoning (Bayesian pragmatics), evolutionary game theory, and conceptual space models of categorisation. I have no doubt that this volume will be a valuable contribution to the current literature on the topic. All chapters are refreshingly original, and they offer surprising connections between vagueness as a semantic phenomenon and other seemingly unrelated problems in game theory, Bayesian epistemology or social choice theory. As a result, the reader is able to acquire a
broad understanding of the problem, as well as a sense of its pervasiveness. The book also exhibits a
delicate balance between conceptual and experimental approaches to vagueness. It is highly
recommended to scholars and graduate students working on epistemology, philosophy of language,
cognitive psychology, or linguistics. Eleonora Cresto, CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Modelling and Reasoning with Vague Concepts-Jonathan Lawry 2006-01-11 This volume introduces a
formal representation framework for modelling and reasoning, that allows us to quantify the
uncertainty inherent in the use of vague descriptions to convey information between intelligent
agents. This can then be applied across a range of applications areas in automated reasoning and
learning. The utility of the framework is demonstrated by applying it to problems in data analysis
where the aim is to infer effective and informative models expressed as logical rules and relations
involving vague concept descriptions. The author also introduces a number of learning algorithms
within the framework that can be used for both classification and prediction (regression) problems.

It is shown how models of this kind can be fused with qualitative background knowledge such as that
provided by domain experts. The proposed algorithms will be compared with existing learning
methods on a range of benchmark databases such as those from the UCI repository.

Vagueness in Context-Stewart Shapiro 2006-01-05 Stewart Shapiro's aim in Vagueness in Context is
to develop both a philosophical and a formal, model-theoretic account of the meaning, function, and
logic of vague terms in an idealized version of a natural language like English. It is a commonplace
that the extensions of vague terms vary with such contextual factors as the comparison class and
paradigm cases. A person can be tall with respect to male accountants and not tall (even short) with
respect to professional basketball players. The main feature of Shapiro's account is that the
extensions (and anti-extensions) of vague terms also vary in the course of a conversation, even after
the external contextual features, such as the comparison class, are fixed. A central thesis is that in
some cases, a competent speaker of the language can go either way in the borderline area of a
vague predicate without sinning against the meaning of the words and the non-linguistic facts.

Shapiro calls this open texture, borrowing the term from Friedrich Waismann. The formal model
theory has a similar structure to the supervaluationist approach, employing the notion of a
sharpening of a base interpretation. In line with the philosophical account, however, the notion of
super-truth does not play a central role in the development of validity. The ultimate goal of the
technical aspects of the work is to delimit a plausible notion of logical consequence, and to explore
what happens with the sorites paradox. Later chapters deal with what passes for higher-order
vagueness - vagueness in the notions of 'determinacy' and 'borderline' - and with vague singular
terms, or objects. In each case, the philosophical picture is developed by extending and modifying
the original account. This is followed with modifications to the model theory and the central meta-
thoerems. As Shapiro sees it, vagueness is a linguistic phenomenon, due to the kinds of languages
that humans speak. But vagueness is also due to the world we find ourselves in, as we try to
communicate features of it to each other. Vagueness is also due to the kinds of beings we are. There
is no need to blame the phenomenon on any one of those aspects.

Vagueness in Communication-Rick Nouwen 2011-01-14 This book constitutes the proceedings of the
International Workshop on Vagueness in Communication, VIC 2009, held as part of ESSLLI 2009, in
Bordeaux, France, July 20-24, 2009. The 11 contributions presented shed a light on new aspects in
the area of vagueness in natural language communication. In contrast to the classical instruments of
dealing with vagueness - like multi-valued logics, truth value gaps or gluts, or supervaluations - this
volume presents new approaches like context-sensitivity of vagueness, the sharpening of vague
predicates in context, and the modeling of precision levels.


Unifying the Philosophy of Truth-Theodora Achourioti 2015-06-16 This anthology of the very latest
research on truth features the work of recognized luminaries in the field, put together following a
rigorous refereeing process. Along with an introduction outlining the central issues in the field, it provides a unique and unrivaled view of contemporary work on the nature of truth, with papers selected from key conferences in 2011 such as Truth Be Told (Amsterdam), Truth at Work (Paris), Paradoxes of Truth and Denotation (Barcelona) and Axiomatic Theories of Truth (Oxford). Studying the nature of the concept of ‘truth’ has always been a core role of philosophy, but recent years have been a boom time in the topic. With a wealth of recent conferences examining the subject from various angles, this collection of essays recognizes the pressing need for a volume that brings scholars up to date on the arguments. Offering academics and graduate students alike a much-needed repository of today's cutting-edge work in this vital topic of philosophy, the volume is required reading for anyone needing to keep abreast of developments, and is certain to act as a catalyst for further innovation and research.

The Philosophical Problem of Vagueness—Amanda Marie Egge 2000

Aspects of Vagueness—Heinz J. Skala 2012-12-06 The Second World Conference on Mathematics at the Service of Man was held at the Universidad Politecnica de Las Palmas, Canary Islands, Spain, June 28 to July 3, 1982. The first volume of the Proceedings of the Conference, entitled "Functional Equations-Theory and Applications" has appeared in the Reidel series "Mathematics and Its Applications". The papers in this volume consist of the invited lectures delivered at the Conference, Section 7: Non-Classical Logics and Modelling, as well as some selected papers which offer an introduction to the methodology and to the literature of the broad and fascinating field of vagueness, imprecision and uncertainty. The contributed papers appeared in the volume of photo-offset preprints distributed at the Conference. It is our hope that the papers present a good sample with respect to the background, the formalism and practice of this area of research as far as we understand it today. As the subject "Vagueness" touches many aspects of human thinking, the contributions have been made from a broad spectrum ranging from philosophy through pure mathematics to probability theory and mathematical economics, therefore the careful reader should find some new insights here. In conclusion, the editors want to thank all authors who have contributed to this volume; the publishers of "Commentationes Mathematicae Universitatis Carolinae" for permission to reprint the paper "Fuzziness and Fuzzy Equality", Commentationes Mathematicae Universitatis Carolinae 23 (1982), 249-267, and D. Reidel for friendly cooperation.

The GRW Theory and Vagueness in Quantum Mechanics—Peter John Lewis 1996

Plurality of Thought—Kathinka Evers 1991

Saving Truth From Paradox—Hartry Field 2008-03-06 Saving Truth from Paradox is an ambitious investigation into paradoxes of truth and related issues, with occasional forays into notions such as vagueness, the nature of validity, and the Gödel incompleteness theorems. Hartry Field presents a new approach to the paradoxes and provides a systematic and detailed account of the main competing approaches. Part One examines Tarski's, Kripke's, and Lukasiewicz's theories of truth, and discusses validity and soundness, and vagueness. Part Two considers a wide range of attempts to resolve the paradoxes within classical logic. In Part Three Field turns to non-classical theories of truth that restrict excluded middle. He shows that there are theories of this sort in which the conditionals obey many of the classical laws, and that all the semantic paradoxes (not just the simplest ones) can be handled consistently with the naive theory of truth. In Part Four, these theories are extended to the property-theoretic paradoxes and to various other paradoxes, and some issues about the understanding of the notion of validity are addressed. Extended paradoxes, involving the notion of determinate truth, are treated very thoroughly, and a number of different arguments that the theories lead to "revenge problems" are addressed. Finally, Part Five deals with dialetheic approaches to the paradoxes: approaches which, instead of restricting excluded middle, accept certain contradictions but alter classical logic so as to keep them confined to a relatively remote part of the language. Advocates of dialetheic theories have argued them to be better than theories that restrict excluded middle, for instance over issues related to the incompleteness theorems and in avoiding revenge problems. Field argues that dialetheists' claims on behalf of their theories are quite unfounded, and indeed that on some of these issues all current versions of
dialetheism do substantially worse than the best theories that restrict excluded middle.
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